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THE TRIPLE ENTENTE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

By David M. Hannah

A review of the history and circumstances surrounding
the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance provides a
revealing insight into a key disease of western civilization
in our time.
The greatest single underlying cause of the
war was the system of secret alliances which
developed after the Franco-Prussian War. It
gradually divided Europe into two hostile groups
of Powers who were increasingly suspicious of one
another and who steadily built up greater and
greater armies and navies. Though this system of
alliances in one sense tended to preserve peace,
inasmuch as the members within one group often
held their friends or allies in restraint for fear
of becoming involved in war themselves, the system
also made it inevitable that if war did come it
would involve all the Great Powers of Europe. The
members of each group felt bound to support each
other, even in matters where they had no direct
interest, because failure to give support wo~d
have weakened the solidarity of the group. 11
11

The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance may be looked
at in several contexts.

Viewed historically, the Triple

Entente and the Triple Alliance were not isolated events
but part of a whole complex series of international
maneuvers, combinations and recombinations during the
period from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 to the outbreak
of World War I.

The period following the Franco-Prussian

War was characterized by increasing diplomatic activity
following the long period of post-Napoleonic peace.

This

diplomatic activity stemmed partly from a consuming French

1

Sidney Fay Origins of the World War (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1931) P:-3z;;--
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desire to find security against Germany, partly from the
pressure of Germany, newly unified and desperately seeking
to catch up with the rest of the world and striving to
develop a colonial empire.

Germany, fearing French

revenge for the hUmiliating def eat and the cession of
Alsace-Lorraine, undertook to isolate France by forming
the Triple Alliance.
the Mediterranean.

Italy was seeking to expand around
Austria-Hungary hoped to extend its

influence by profiting from the instability of the Balkans
and the declining power of the Ottoman Empire.
In this situation Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy
formed the Triple Alliance of 1882.

In response to this

initiative, France sought an alliance with Russia,
bracketing Germany and raising the specter of a two front
war which had long haunted the Germans.

In 1893 France

and Russia signed a formal defensive treaty known as the
Dual Alliance.
Britain, standing somewhat aloof, but none the less
interested in this competition for domination of the
continent, tried in various ways to cement its position
with all sides.

In 1890 the Anglo-German Treaty settled

British-German differences in Africa and ceded the
Island of Helgoland to Germany.

However this effort

~t

peace-making was short-lived and could not survive
German ambitions.

In 1902 the British made an alliance

with Japan, taking account of the fact that both island
empires wanted to off set against expanding continental
powers, particularly Russia.

In 1904 Britain and France

signed a bilateral entente by which they disposed of
numerous differences between themselves around the world,
including Egypt, Morocco, Newfoundland, Siam, Nigeria
and islands in the Pacific.
the Triple Entente.

This was the genesis of

The Anglo-French entente super-

imposed upon the Franco-R11Ssian Alliance was a step
toward the Triple J:ntente.

The next step was ta.ken in

1907 when Britain and Russia negotiated a similar bilateral
entente resolving their differences in Asia, including
Persia, .Afghanistan and China.

This Anglo-Russian Treaty

was designed to protect the rear of both countries in
order to allow them to concentrate on the rising threat
in Europe by Germany.

Now the Triple Entente and the

Triple Alliance were complete.

The fact that they survived

into World War I resulted not so much from their own
internal cohesion as from the rising external threat which
continued to drive the countries together in their
respective alliances.

Germany pressed hard in Africa,

precititating two serious crises in Morocco in 1905 and
1911.

Italy attacked Turkey in a grab for Libya in 1911.

The Balkan states, taking advantage of the senility of
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the Ottoman ]Cmpire revolted in 1912 and Austria-H'Ungary
sought to profit at the expense of Serbia.
Did the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance
succeed?

Yes and No.

They succeeded to the extent that

they formalized the pattern of the alliances in World War
I, but they failed in that they did not prevent war.

What

can be learned from the experience of the Triple Entente
and the Triple Alliance with respect to the balance of
power theory?
the balance.

In the first place they did not preserve
Even more important, however, is the fact

that they illustrate the impossibility of a balance of
power in the absence of fundamental agreement among the
participants regarding the nature of the world they are
trying to preserve.

Treaties and alliances in themselves

do not create order or stability; they only reflect such
stability as

may

already exist.

The threat to Europe had its beginnings in the
unif ieation of Germany by Bismarck.

In 1862 Bismarck

became the Chancellor of Prussia under William I.

William

I had been a soldier in his youth and had campaigned
against Napoleon.

One of his first moves had been to

reorganize the army, for Prussian prestige in the past
had sunk to an all time low among the Great Powers.
When the I1ng of Denmark and the German States were in
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disagreement over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein
the opportunity for which Bismarck had been waiting had
arrived.

Persuading Austria to act with him, he

overwhelmed Denmark, forcing her to surrender the two
disputed Duchies to Austria and Prussia.
So long as Austria continued to be a member of the
German Confederation, Prussia could not go ahead with her
plans for unification.

So

when trouble developed as to

the disposition of Schleswig and Holstein, Bismarck did
nothing to prevent the quarrel.
for war with Austria.

He was in fact preparing

Napoleon III gave Bismarck a

guarantee of neutrality, receiving in exchange vague
promises of Rhineland territory.
In seven short weeks Bismarck's army had accomplished
his purpose.

Austria's main army was crushed at Sadowa

in 1866, and she was forced to withdraw from the German
Confederation.

In fact Bismarck had destroyed the whole

German Confederation.

Now he was ready to proceed.

He

organized a union of North German States under Prussian
domination.

Hanover and five other states were also

annexed to Prussia against their will.

This was the first

step in Biamarck 1 s plan for national unity.

He now

turned his attention to the southern states of Germany.
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By a series of diplomatic moves Bismarck precipitated
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 in which south
Germany took part, thus making it a national struggle
instead of merely Prussian., The entire country had
become a unit, and the French were overwhelmed at
Sedan in September of 1870.

By the terms of the Treaty

of Frankfort:
1.

The Germans, in order to prevent the rise of
France, took the provinces of Alsace and
Lorraine.

2.

France was forced to pay a huge indemnity
of 5,000,000 francs.

The Germans were to

occupy Northern France until the debt was
paid.
Through this victory Bismarck had cemented the union
of the German states.

"Bismarck's unification of Germany

was hailed at the time as a desirable, even glorious,
accomplishment of the spirit of nationalism. 11

2

Thus

was born in Europe a new political state.
Bismarck had made a serious mistake in the taking ot
Alsace-Lorraine from the French, because it was a

2

Sidney Fay Origins of the World War (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1931) P:-51
-
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humiliating defeat that France never forgot. "The new
structure of the German Empire was burdened at the
outset by a French mortgage, as it were, since in the
future every foe of Germany could reckon unconditionally
upon French support.• 3

The price paid ror Alsaoe-

Lorraine was the undying determination of France for
revenge.

Bismarck was acutely aware or this and watched

anxiously as France made moves which might break down
Germany•s new position.

Bismarck said that the land he

had taken from France had been wrested from Germany by
Louis XIV when Germany was weak and divided.
To keep France from forming any alliance that
might be detrimental to Germany, Bismarck was determined
to isolate France from any potential ally. ·He adopted
a policy of malting new alliances, thereby hoping to keep
France from making any alignment which might be harmful
to Germany.

"He must therefore protect the new German

Empire, the child of his creation, by malting it strong
of itself--strong by holding France weak and isolated."

3 Charles Seymour The Diplomatic Background of the
War (New Haven: Yale University Press 1933) P. 1~ 4 Sidney B. Fay The Origins of the World War (New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1931) p;-53
-

4

One of his first objectives was an alliance with
Russia, for Germany, lying between Russia and France,
might be made the object of a two front war.

Russia

and Prussia had been friendly since the days of
Napoleon, and the Crimean War had strengthened this
feeling of friendship.

Russia had remained neutral

during the Franco-Prussian War and Germany had allowed
Russia to send her warships out on the Black Sea.
There had been a bond between the two countries because
of the friendship of Kaiser Wilhelm and Alexander II
of Russia.
Bismarck also desired friendship with Austria
believing that the similarity of the German racial
element in both countries should cause them to be
natural friends.

He had refrained from taking any land

or entering Vienna with troops after the Treaty of
Sadowa.

Bismarck's greatest difficulty in securing a

union of Austria and Germany lay with Beust, the
Austrian chancellor, who hated Prussia and Bismarck,
and who refused to be drawn into a treaty with Bismarck,
but gravitated toward France.
to get rid of Beust.

Bismarck was determined

The Hapsburg Empire was divided

into three divisions, the Germans, Maygars and Slavs.
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The compromise of 1867 had divided the power between
the Germans and the Maygars who were jealous of each
other.

Since Beust refused Bismarck's advances,

Bismarck turned to the Maygars who were led_by Count
Andrassy.

Count Andrassy thought he saw an opportunity

to make the Maygars supreme so Beust was overthrown as
Chancellor of Austria and replaced by Andrassy.

Now the

Maygars were tree to extend their influence into the
Balkans and Bismarck was tree to establish closer ties
with Austria.
In the summer of 1871 Emperor William of Germany and
Francis Joseph of Austria met on Austrian soil for a
friendly visit and in April of 1872 the two met in Berlin.
Alexander of Russia did not want to be left out so he
suggested that he come to Berlin.

The three monarchs

established close relations though there were no written
agreements.

In a sense this entente was a renewal of the

Holy Alliance.

The three were to stand together against

the rising tide of socialism and for the general peace of
Europe.

In 1873 the League of the Three Emperors was

strengthened by a meeting at St. Petersburg.

Russia and

Germany promised each other the assistance of 200,000
men in case of attack by a European power.
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A few weeks

later Czar Alexander went to Austria, and he and Francis
Joseph signed an agreement to consult one another about
differing opinions.

In the following year the King of

Italy also crone to Berlin and announced his adherence to
the Three Emperor's League.

So it appeared that France

had been isolated since Great Britain was not active in
European affairs at this time.
The League did not prove to be of any permanent value,
and the understanding that existed between the three
emperors was soon destroyed by the strain of two crises.
The first of these occurred in 1875 when it seemed as if
war might again break out between France and Germany.
Gorchakov, the foreign minister of Russia, was jealous
of Bismarck and leaned toward an alliance with France.

This

caused Bismarck to fear he might use his influence against
him with Czar Alexander of Russia.

so Bismarck sent

Radowitz to Russia to take the place of the ailing German
ambassador.

Gorchakov had circulated rumors that Radowitz

had been sent to secure from Russia her consent to Germany
having a free hand in France if Russia could have a free
hand in the Orient.

This alarmed France, and her foreign

minister appealed to the Czar and to England to prevent
German aggression against France.
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After the tension had

eased, Gorchakov•s vanity was appeased by his announcement,
"Now peace has been established."

Thus the first war scare

was over, but now cooler relationships existed between
Russia and Germany.
A new threat to the League of Three Emperors was brought
about by the Near Eastern Crises of 1875-1878.

The "sickman

of Europe", Turkey, was committing outrages and causing
suffering among her Christian subjects, and Russia again
wondered about his demise.

The Christians revolted in

Herzegovina and the revolt spread into Bosnia.

Turkey

seemed powerless to stop it which put Russia and Austria
in their old difficulty over the Balkans.

Austria did not

wish to see these Christians achieve their independence and
become subservient to Russia.

For fifteen years Bismarck

worked to prevent this rivalry in the Balkans because he
did not wish to see either of the two powers gravitate
toward France and wished them to remain friends.

He said,

11 if, to our sorrow this was not possible
between Russia and Austria then we could endure
indeed that our friends should lose or win
battles against each other, but not that one of
the two should be so severely wounded and injured
that its position as an independent Great Power,
taking its part in the councils of Europe, would
be endangered." 5

5 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Allianc.!'., and Triple
Entente (New York:

Henry Holt and Co. 1947) P. 10
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Schmitt in his book "takes the stand that it is
significant that Bismarck had chosen Austria and that
decision governed his policy for the rest of his career."

6

Russia recognized Bismarck's decision and abandoned
war against Austria to fight against the Turks, forcing
her to accept the Treaty of San Stefano of 1877 which
created a great Bulgarian state.

This neither Austria

nor England liked, for they feared Bulgaria would become
a Russian vassal.
treaty.

So they asked for a revision of the

Bismarck, the so called "Honest Broker", consented

to act as mediator and invited the Great Powers to the
Congress of Berlin.

His aim was to satisfy the claims and

interests of both Austria and Russia.

Austria was again

given the right to occupy and administer Herzegovina and
Russia acquired part of Bessarabia lost in 1856 and other
territory between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.
Gorchakov felt that Bismarck had betrayed Russia in view
of the fact that Russia had been a "benevolent neutralu
during the Franco-Prussian War.

The result of this

personal bitterness between the two ministers and of the
violent newspaper attacks of one country against the other
put an end, for the time being, to that harmony and
cooperation which had been the object of the Three
Emperors' League.

6 Ibid, P. 10
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Russia increased her armaments and placed troops
near the German borders.

Czar Alexander wrote a letter

to Emperor William complaining of Bismarck's policies
and warning that disaster might follow such policies.
General Mileutin declared,

11

Russ1a must be prepared for

war • ., 7
At the same time Bismarck heard that his friend
Andrassy was soon to resign and was likely to be replaced
by Baron Haymerle :1 a friendship on which he was not sure
that he could count.

In view of this new danger he

decided on an alliance with Austria, while Andrassy was
still in office.

He drew up a treaty of October 7, 1879,

which established the Austro-German Alliance.

The

alliance provided:
1.

That if Germany or Austria were attacked by
Russia the one contracting party would come to
the aid of the other.

2.

If either of the contracting parties were attacked
by France or Italy the other contracting party
would maintain a benevolent neutrality.

York:

3.

This treaty was made renewable every five years.

4.

It was to remain secret.

7 Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War (New
The Macmillan Co., 1931) P. 0 8 -
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This alliance was defensive in

char~cter,

and it

consolidated the central empires and proved to be the
foundation of the German policy until her collapse in
November, 1918.

The alliance was known as the Dual

Alliance and was regarded by contemporaries as
Bismarck's master stroke.

But after 1914 when German

support of Austria involved Europe in World War I, it
was thought that the alliance had pushed Russia and
France into an alliance, and Germany, by siding against
Russia, had paved the way for the clash of 1914.
Giera, who replaced Gorcha.kov, still wanted closer
relations with Germany.

Thus Bismarck, through diplomatic

concessions, permitted the League of the Three Emperors
to be revived in 1881.

It lasted until 1887.

It ran out

because of Alexander•s distrust of Austria over the Balkans.
Bismarck's relations with France grew steadily worse
and his worst fear was a Franco-Russian proposal of
alliance.

He therefore agreed to a Russian proposal that

in place of the triparite agreement Germany and Russia
would have an agreement without Austria.
known as the "Reinsurance Treaty" of 1887.

This treaty is
The terms

were as follows.
l.

If one of the High Contracting Parties shall
find itself at war with a third Great Power
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the other will maintain a benevolent neutrality
and will devote its energy to localize the
conflict.

This provision made Germany sa.f'e on

the eastern frontier.

The southern frontier was

protected by Austria's promise of a benevolent
neutrality.

Furthermore this treaty did not

conflict with the treaty with Austria-Hungary.
2.

The treaty also recognizes the rights historically
acquired by Russia in the Balkans.

3.

Article III said that Russia and Germany should
support each other in putting pressure on the
Sultan to keep the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles
closed to the warships of other powers.

They

also pledged themselves to permit no modification
of the status quo in the Balkans.
The formation of the Triple Alliance is commonly
ascribed to the "iron man", Bismarck.

He had encouraged

the French plans in Tunis in order to make friends with
France so that they might forget their def eat in 1870.
Bismarck was hoping the French would maintain their
interest in North Africa and China forgetting their
determination to recover Alsace-Lorraine.

He did not

object to the French antagonizing the Italians who also
had an interest in North Africa, but he was not planning
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to make an alliance with Italy.

However, early in 1882,

Italy in order to strengthen her own position and to
gain support for further plans, asked for an alliance
with Germany and Austria.

By this she felt she had

everything to gain and nothing to lose.

She had been

disappointed at the Congress of Berlin in that she had
been given nothing and was further resentful when the
French occupied Tunis, the territory she had hoped to
gain for herself.

While Bismarck was not eager for this

alliance he realized that it would strike a blow at the
French desire for revenge, so he suggested that the
Italians consult the Austrians.

This resulted in the

negotiating and signing of the Triple Alliance in Vienna
on May 20, 1882.
"The general purposes of Austria, Italy, and
Germany were, according to the preamble, 1 to augment
the guarantees of peace in general, to strengthen
the monarchical principle, and by this to insure
intact the maintenance of the social and political
order in their respective states by agreeing to
conclude a treaty which by its essentially conservative
and defensive character aimed only to protect them
against the dangers which might menace the safety of
their states and the peace of Europe. 1 "
'Art. I. 1 The High Contracting Powers mutually
promise peace and friendship, and will enter into
no alliance or engagement directed against any one
of their States. * * * 111
"Art.- II. 1 In case Italy, without direct
provocation on her part, should be attacked by
France, for any reason whatsoever, the two other
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contracting parties shall be bound to lend help
and assistance with all their forces. This same
obligation shall devolve upon Italy in case of
any aggression without direct provocation by
France against Germany.'"
"Art. III provided for the danger of a FrancoRussian coalition: 1 If one, or two, of the High
Contracting Parties, without direct provocation on
their part, should chance to be attacked and to be
engaged in a war with two or more Great Powers
non-signatory to the present treaty, the casus
foederis will arise simultaneously for all the
High Contracting Parties. 1 This virtually extended
to. Italy the principle agreed upon between Austria
and Germany in 1879, except that the addition of
the words •without direct provocation• gave the
obligation a more restricted and purely defensive
character. 11
Art. IV: 1 In case a Great Power, non-signatory
to the present treaty, should threaten the security
of the states of one of the High Contracting Parties,
and the threatened Party should find itself forced
on that account to make war against it, the two
others bind themselves to observe towards their
Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each of them reserves
to itself, in this case, the right to take part in
the war if it should see fit to make common cause
with its Ally. 111
11

"Art. V was calculated to secure solidarity
of action. 11
"The Treaty of Alliance was for five years, and
8
its contents and its existence were to be kept secret."

8 Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War
(New York: The MacMillan Co., 19JIT p:-a2-84 -
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Italy 1 s prestige and power were increased by alliance
with the German Empire and she was now regarded as one ot
the Great Powers.

Another important advantage to her was

that Austria was no longer Italy's enemy but had become her
ally.
Austria's chief advantage from the treaty was a
guarantee that if Russia attacked her over issues in the
Balkans her frontier with Italy would be secure trom attack
so that her armies would not have to be divided.
Germany hoped that Italy would not now be able to
ally herself with France, and would discourage the revenge
party in France.

If Russia joined France it would be a

great advantage to Germany to be relieved of the fear in
regard to Italy.
On October 30, 1883, the Austro-Rumanian Treaty was
signed as another bulwark against war.
On March of 1890 came the dismissa1 of Bismarck and
now the way was paved for the formation of a Franco-Russian
Alliance.

The new chancellor Capriv1 had not renewed the

treaty with Russia and Russia, like France, found herself
isolated.

Then, too, Germany•s rapid growth of industry,

commerce, naval ambitions and colonial expansion further
posed a threat to Russia.

Another factor was Russia's
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determination to dominate the Balkans.

This antagonized

Austria so William II had to choose between Russia and
Austria and he chose Austria, thus making Russia an enemy
of the Central Powers.

A third factor was the idea of

France's determination to seek revenge on Germany.

But

France had become more stable as a government and the

Czar saw her in a different light.
The Franco-Russian Entente of 1891, which became the
alliance of 1894, was brought about by the distrust of
Germany felt by both countries.

They were also aware that

Great Britain was friendly to the members of the Triple
Alliance and consequently they felt isolated.

This feeling

of isolation gradually drew them together in spite of the
differences in their forms of government.

Russian

suspicion of Germany stemmed partially from the fact that
Bismarck had sent German officers to drill the Turkish
army.

This move the Russians could not reconcile with

Bismarck's assurances that he was not interested in
Constantinople or the Balkans •
.Another situation which had developed added to Russian
distrust of Germany.

The Russian ruble had fallen and

German newspapers attacked Russian credit.

The Russians

had suspected that Bismarck had inspired this attack and
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so were more willing to turn to France for the loan they
needed.

This the French were willing to grant.

First,

because it gave them a good investment for their savings.
Second, by becoming Russiats creditor they were furthering
their interest in an ally which might some day assist
them in their long-delayed revenge on Germany.

These

loans of money were followed by Russian orders in France
for military equipment.
"It was this general situation which finally
drew Russia and France, both of them isolated and
fearing that Great Britain might join the Triple
Alliance, into a diplomatic understanding. Even
so, the Russians appear to have been somewhat
reluctant, but a French hint that future loans
were dependent on a bargain brought them to terms. •1 9
The first step taken was when the French fleet visited
the Russian naval base near St. Petersburg.

11

All Europe

was properly shocked when the autocratic Tsar listened
bareheaded to the playing of the Marseillaise, but there
was no doubt about the Franco-Russian partnership.

11

10

This friendship was formally acknowledged by an exchange
of notes between the two governments on the 27th of
August, 1891.

The agreement contained no military

9 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple
Entente (New York: Henry Holt and Co. 1947) p:-r;;o
10
Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple
Entente (New York: Henry Holt and Co. 1947) P:-4°0

-20-

guarantees but did require the two governments to consult
with one another if any emergency arose.

The French

people, always afraid that they would be attacked by
Germany were not satisfied with a vague agreement.

Another

meet,ing was held in 1892 where an understanding was reached
between the French and Russian general staffs.

But it was

two years before the Czar consented to the ratification
of the military agreement.
secret.

Even then the terms were kept

The essential provisions were as follows:

"Article I. If France is attacked by Germany,
or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall
employ all her available forces to fight Germany.
If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria
supported by Germany, France shall employ all her
available forces to fight Germany.
Article II. In case the forces of the Triple
Alliance or one of the Great Powers which compose
it should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the
first indication of the event, and without previous
agreement being necessary, shall mobilize all their
forces immediately and simultaneously, and shall
11
transport them as near to the frontier as possible."

11 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple
Entente (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1947) P:-4°2
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The two countries agreed that neither would conclude a separate
peace and that the treaty should last as long as the Triple
Alliance.

"The Dual Alliance and the Triple Alliance did, it

would seem, guarantee the peace of Europe; at least they
preserved it.

During these years the two groups stood side by

side; often there was considerable co-operation between them.
Only later developments caused them to take position face to face."
This new alliance did not at first alarm Germany because she
felt that the Triple Alliance was as strong as the new
combination.

Also she felt that England held the balance

of power, would not join with France or Russia.

However, the

alliance did give Germany a new respect for her neighbors.
The system of alliances by creating this feeling of respect
between countries helped to curb situations which might have
developed into war.
When France and Italy ended their dispute over Tunis
by a treaty a change was made in Italy 1 s alignment with
Germany in the Triple Alliance.

Italy was bound to Germany

only in case Germany was attacked by France without direct
provocation, and Italy was to decide what was direct
provocation.

In this new agreement Italy promised France

she would remain neutral in case of an attack on Germany

12 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple
Entente (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1947) P~4
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12

by a foreign power.

Thus Bismarck was proved correct

in his analysis of the Italians as "undependable children".
They could not be relied upon.
The .Anglo-French Entente of 1904 began when M.
Delcasse' signified his intention of seeking an understanding with England.

He knew that if France were to

expand her colonial empire, and perhaps some day recover
Alsace-Lorraine, her hostility with England must end.
They had been nearing agreement for some time.
agreement was helped along by two events.

This

First, Germany

had supported the proposal of the Egyptian government,
which was British, that certain international funds should
be used to reconquer the Sudan.

France and Russia opposed

this so the British undertook the 9A'J>edition without aid.
Sir Herbert Kitchner defeated the native army of Sudan
in September, 1898.

Then he learned that Major Marchand

with French troops had arrived at Fashoda.

When Kitchner

reached Fashoda he requested the withdrawal of French
troops, and Marchand refused to leave.

The British were

ready to fight to protect their colonies in the Sudan, but
the French were not ready to undertake a war at this time
so Marchand•s forces withdrew.

England ma.de one concession

by permitting a strip of the Eastern Sahara to come under
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French influence.

This pleased France because it gave

her an outlet on the Nile.

So in March, 1899, this

long dispute between France and England was settled.
The second circumstances which removed obstacles
from a British-French agreement was a change in French
policy.

Delcasse' was aware that France had relied too

long on Russia alone, that Germany was always the real
enemy of the French.

He had come to power with a plan

to resolve Anglo-French difficulties •.
It was the British, however, who made the first move.
The death of Queen Victoria and the retirement of Lord
Salisbury in 1902 opened the way for closer relations with
France.

Edward VII had spent much time in Paris and knew

the French, so in the spring of 1903 he went to France for
a visit.

At first the French were cool towards him, but

his charm won their friendship.

Two months later President

Loubet and Delcasse 1 began the conversations which led to
the signing of the Entente Cordiale eight months later on
April 8, 1904.

A series of talks settled many long

standing disputes between the two countries.

An important

question was settled when France gave England a free hand
in Egypt and in return the French were given a free hand
in Morocco.

They agreed also to give each other diplomatic

support.
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While this new entente dealt only with questions
outside Europe, yet Europe was affected by it, because
if France and England were pledging their agreements
in African affairs they would very likely cooperate in
other areas.

The Entente Cordiale was not directed

against Germany or any other country, but it did provide
a restraint on Germany's policy.
The Entente Cordiale had now a far more reaching
effect than it was thought to have at the time.
"There is little conclusive evidence that at
the outset England planned to isolate Germany or
to encourage France to count on England for more
than diplomatic support, and even this was to be
limited to the case of Morocco. On the other hand,
there is much evidence that, within a few months,
the Anglo-French Entente came to have a far wider
significance inimical to the peace of Europe-partly owing to Germany•s clumsy and alarming
diplomatic gestures.'' 13
The Anglo-French agreement was the cause of concern
to some British diplomats who feared it might bring about
war with Germany.

Germany's diplomats were surprised at

the move, and hoped it would help to maintain peace in
Europe.

They began to countermove.

Their plan was to

attack the French policy in Morocco thereby hoping that
they could gain a section themselves.

But William the II

disapproved of this move, for he had no wish to antagonize
the French.

York:

Bulow waited for nearly a year but Delcasset

1 3 Sidney B. Fa:y, The Ori,ins of the World War (New
The MacMillan co:-;-1931 P. lb7~
~
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said nothing about the Moroccan agreement so Bulow
prevailed upon the Kaiser against the latter's will
to land at Tangier and proclaim Morocco a free state.
Rouvier, the French Prime Minister, was alarmed and
since the negotiations over Morocco were made by
Delcasse', suggested that the latter's resignation
might avert the crisis.

Then the Moroccan question

could be submitted to an international conference.
Rouvier disapproved the German action but Bulow and
Holstein insisted that if necessary he would stand
behind the issue with force.

Delcasse' defended his

policy and informed the French cabinet that if Germany
did mean war England had an alliance with the French.
Delcasse 1 felt that the British were pushing France and
Germany into war so he resigned.

Germany had come out

victorious in the encounter, but her successes were
short lived.

Rouvier said that Germany had not been

acting in good faith, so he turned to England who assured
him of British good will.

The Entente Cordiale was

strengthened and the diplomatic position of France was
more secure.
When the Russians fired on British fishing vessels
in the North Sea a crisis developed between Russia and
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Great Britain.

Germany offered Russia an alliance which

they thought they could force France to join, but the
crisis subsided and the Germans had failed to get an
alliance with France.
The def eat of Russia in the Far East and the revolutionary
movement at home had brought the Russian government into
difficulty.

In July, 1905, William the II invited Nicholas

the II to meet him in Finnish waters.

Nicholas accepted

and when William cleverly suggested that the two of them
conclude a treaty, the Czar fell in with the plan.
July 24, the treaty of Bjorke was signed.

On

This treaty

provided for an alliance between Russia and Germany.
William had hoped that Russia could persuade her ally,
France, to join them in an alliance.
been, as the Emperor said,

1

"The treaty might have

a turning point in the history

of Europe', that is, if France had been willing to join
it." 14 W1lliam 1 s fondest hope was for a five nation
treaty, a continental league, and he felt now that his dream
would come true.

14 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple
Entente (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1947) P:--73
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His confidence was short-lived.
threatened to resign.

Chancellor Bulow

Count Lamsdorf, the Tsar 1 s

Foreign Minister, was equally perturbed because he felt
the Bjorko Treaty was contrary to the spirit of the RussoFrench Alliance.

He assured the Tsar that France would

never join in such a treaty.

Thereupon Nicholas the II

notified William tha.t the treaty would have to be amended.
William refused and the Bjorko incident was ended.
Great Britain formed a new Liberal government in
December of 1905 with Sir Edward Grey taking the place of
Landsdowne who had negotiated the Entente Cordiale.

France

asked Great Britain for their backing at the Morocco
Conference but this Grey would not give without Parliament's
consent because the Entente was not a defensive alliance.
He did agree, however, to military conversations between
the French and British military staffs, but specified that
the talks would not be binding.

It is significant to note

that the French in making their plans assumed that the
British would do certain things.

The British organized

the army and had consultations with the Belgian military
staff.

The Entente Cordiale had become stronger.

Winston Churchill remarked,
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As

"Henceforth the relations of the two staffs
became increasingly intimate and confidential ••••
However explicitly the two governments might
agree and affirm to each other that no national
or political engagement was involved in these
technical discussions, the fact remained1 that they
constituted an exceedingly potent tie." 5
A peculiar situation had developed in that France,
the ally of Russia was now on cordial terms with Great
Britain.

Great Britain was the ally of Japan who was at

war with Russia.

Delcasse 1 had been working toward an

understanding between Russia and Great Britain and had
made no secret of it.

The British were not unwilling and

had, in fact, made overtures to Russia in 1903 but nothing
had come of it because the Russians were aware of British
influence in Japan.

When Russia was defeated by the

Japanese she turned her attention to the Near East where
the situation was now different.
opposed Russian policy in Turkey.

Great Britain no longer
Since she was well

entrenched in Egypt she was indifferent to Turkey's fate.
Within Russia the revolution of 1905 had given opportunity
for Russian liberalism and so the time seemed ripe.
Sir Edward Grey, a liberal, welcomed the entente with
France and also favored an understanding with Russia.

l5 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple
Entente (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1947) P:--75
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The

Anglo~Russian

agreement which dealt with the Middle

East was signed August 31, 1907.

There were three documents

dealing with Tibet, Persia, and Afghanistan.
to remain under Chinese influence.

Tibet was

Afghanistan was to be

a buffer state between Russia and British India.

Persia

was divided into three spheres of influence, Russian,
British and a neutral zone.
consulted.

The Shah of Persia was not

Both Russia and Great Britain assured Germany

that the treaty was not directed against her, but Germany
knew that having established cordial relations the two
countries could unite and challenge her interests.

More

than that Great Britain, France and Russia were now
closely associated and together they could offer a
formidable opposition to the Triple Alliance.
In this same year Russia and Japan, although they
had recently been at war, signed an agreement, while France
and Japan whose relationship had been strained by the
Russo-Japanese War, concluded a treaty by which they agreed
to respect the independence and integrity of China and
the principal of the "open door".
Great Britain and France with Spain published
declarations for maintaining the status quo in the
.Mediterranean.

Germany did not approve of this relationship.
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The Algeciras Conf erenc~ of 1906 was important in
that though Germany seemed to win she actually lost
because Great Britain was led into naval and military
talks which ultimately brought her against Germany in
1914.
Russia had promised Austria that she could annex
Bosnia and Herzegovina when the right time had come.
Austria assumed the time had come and annexed the two
territories.

Russia's part of the bargain securing the

opening of the straits for her warships had to be
confirmed by other powers.
in two ways.

This precipitated a crisis

Since the population of the two territories

was largely Serb, Serbia had hoped to annex them herself.
Germany announced that if Austria invaded Serbia
Russia intervened Germany would mobilize.

an~

France and

England had no wish to be drawn in so Russia abandoned
Serbia after a stiff note from Germany.

The Triple Alliance

had stood successfully against the Triple Entente.

Russia,

however, began to reorganize and expand her military power.
The British increased their navy and the Triple Entente
was strengthened.
Germany's new chancellor, Bethman-Hollweg wanted to
improve relations with at least one of the powers of the
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Triple Entente so he approached Great Britain because of
Grey's insistance that there was nothing against Germany
in their agreements with Russia and France.

England

refused to remain neutral in a possible European war so
the negotiations were fruitless except that a friendlier
relationship was created between the two governments.
Bethman-Hollweg ne«t turned to Russia and at Potsdam an
agreement was made which caused considerable commotion in
England and France because they teared that Russia might
have betrayed her partners in the Triple Entente.
The Moroccan agreement of 1909 had not accomplished
everything that was hoped for, but it had brought about
better relations between France and Germany.

However,

international disorder in Morocco made French occupation
of Fez imminent so Germany sent her warships to Agadir
ostensibly to protect the Germans there, but since there
were no Germans in the vicinity the French decided to
refrain from sending their own ships to Agadir and wait for
Germany to make the next move.

This surprised Kiderlen,

German foreign minister, so he suggested that the French
Congo would be acceptable as their price for allowing
France to have Morocco.

The French bluntly refused his

off er but an agreement between France and Germany was made
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on November 4, 1911, by which Germany agreed to a French
protectorate over Morocco and received in return a portion
of the French Congo.

The Germans were disappointed with

the results and blamed England who had suspected German
intentions and had made a statement to the effect that
Britain could not be ignored when her interests were
vitally affected.

She had stepped up the military

conversations with France and settled the details of the
plans for the armies to fight side by side.
The situation was tense and the German emperor approved
Tirpitz 1 s plans for extending the German navy although
agreements had been made to follow the naval program laid
down earlier.

Lord Haldane, the British minister of war,

who Wlderstood the Germans well, went to Berlin.

He was

informed that the Germans would give up plans for increasing
their navy if they could have the assurance of British
neutrality in case of war.

Agreement was impossible though

the motives of both parties were sincere.

In effect the

Germans said,
"Situated as we are between France and
Russia, we cannot discuss a limitation unless
Great Britain will abandon the Triple Entente.
To this the British replied: We cannot
abandon the Entente if you continue to add to 6
your navy, for you have the Triple Alliance." 1
l6 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple
Entente (New YDi!k: Henry Holt and Co., 1947) P. 91
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Bethman-Hollweg, though he had tried to weaken the Triple
Entente by negotiating with each member in turn, had not
been successful and had in fact only made the three
nations suspicious of his intentions.

The Triple Entente

was stronger than ever before and had perhaps postponed
war for a time.
When Italy attacked Tripoli in September, 1911, the
Russian government proposed a conference with France, and
Poincare, the French premier and minister of foreign
affairs, realized .that without Russia's support France
could not stand up to Germany.

He also knew that he must

be in a position to influence Russian policy in the Near
East.

He encouraged talks with Izvolski, the Russian

Ambassador to Paris and the two cooperated with England
in tightening the Triple Entente.

Poincare announced that

"France is incontestably disposed to peace
and neither seeks nor desires war, but the intezvention of Germany against Russia would immediately
modify this state of mind ••• in such case parliament
and public opinion would entirely approve the
decision of the government to lend armed support to
Russia." 17
Poincare next turned to affairs in the Balkans.

He

learned in August, 1912, when he was visiting Russia, of a

l7 Ibid:

P. 94
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treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria which the Russians
helped to negotiate.

He urged that Russia henceforth

consult with France about her policies, and was
instrumental in restraining Russia from taking premature
action in the Balkans.

He also exerted pressure on Serbia

who was pushing her dispute with Austria.

In fact in

1913-1914 France and Russia were able to work together in
an effort to settle the quarrels in the Balkans.

Naturally

their view was directly opposed to that of the Triple
Alliance so the cleavage in Europe was gradually becoming
more clear.
Notes between the French and the British confirmed
their cooperation in military and naval affairs though an
open and formal alliance was impossible because of
Parliament's unwillingness to grant it.

Britain had never

reached as close relationship with Russia as France had,
and Germany was still banking on Britain 1 s neutrality.
However, in the spring of 1914 Russia suggested that the
Triple Entente become a formal alliance, and Grey a.greed
to discuss it with his colleagues.

He recognized that

Russia was a formidable power and hoped to continue
friendly relations with her.
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The powers of the Triple Alliance were likewise more
closely united in July, 1914.
renewed in December,1912.

The alliance had been

Austria was not sure of the

reliance they could place on Italy, but Germany had no
such fears about her.

And in fact Germany at this time

had no quarrels with France.

The German ambassador had

written in February, 1914, that the salvation of France
must be sought in a better relationship with Germany.
Alsace-Lorraine had not been forgotten but he thought
it would be unlikely that France would try to revive the
issue.

The Near East and its problems seemed the real

threat to the peace in Europe.

Russia deplored the

increase of German influence in Turkey because she still
wanted the use of the Straits.

Turkey was friendly to

the Triple Alliance and had an agreement with Bulgaria.
It was Serbia who occupied the key position at this
time.

Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had

caused a six months crisis and started the drift towards
war.

As the Germans had been unified under Bismarck there

was, in 1914, a movement for unification of all the Slavic
peoples south of the Danube.

The natural leader of this

movement was Serbia, because independent herself, she
wished to secure the independence and unification of the
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rest of the Serbs.

Moreover, Serbia was not only a

threat to the Hapsburgs and an impediment to Germany,
she was actually a wedge of the influence of the Triple
Entente in the Balkans.
The terms of the settlement of Buk.arest in April,
1913, had proven so unsatisfactory that it seemed unlikely
that they would stand.

The Balkan States were so worn out

by wars that the treaty might have held if the Balkan
States only had been concerned.

But the diplomatic

prestige of the Powers had suffered.

For Austria and

Germany the settlement of 1913 was not only a humiliation
but was a danger.

Austria was threatened at home as Serbia

became stronger and an internal revolution of the Slavs
in Austria seemed imminent.
break up Serbian power.

Austria was determined to

German military prestige had

suffered and she had failed in her diplomacy.
Consequently during the fall of 1913 and the spring
of 1914 Austria waited for an opportunity that might give
her an excuse to attack Serbia.

The Serbian government

was aware of this and were careful to maintain a correct
attitude.

On June 28, 1914, Austria's opportunity came

with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir
apparent to the Austrian crown.

The murder was committed
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by a member of a Serb nationalist group called the
11

Black Hand" society.

Austria sent ultimatum to Serbia

that meant the end of Serbian independence.

Serbia's

reply was conciliatory but Vienna rejected it and declared
war on July 28.

The Russians urged Serbia to comply.

England offered to mediate but Austria was determined
on war. Russia mobilized on July 30, Germany on July 31,
and Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, and
against France on August 3.

The alliances held firm but

the two armed camps now faced each other, and Europe
was at war.
11 That

evening as he looked out from the
windows of the foreign off ice in London this
English country gentleman (Sir Edward Grey)
spoke words that have echoed plaintively down
the years. 'The lamps', he said, 1 are going
out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit
again in our lifetime.• 11 18
To repeat a statement made earlier in this paper,
treaties and alliances in themselves do not create order
or stability; they only reflect such stability as may
already exist.

18

David Thomson Europe Since Napoleon (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1962~ P. 507
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The fundamental meaning of this experiment in the balance
of power is that Western civilization, under the leadership
of Europe and America, lacked the internal cohesiveness
to preserve the favored position of world rule which it
had established.

Given another chance after World War I,

it failed again.

It is interesting to note that most of

the Pre-World War I alliances and ententes were primarily
concerned with the settlement of differences between
European countries concerning their colonial interests
outside of Europe.

They thought to preserve Western

domination of the world by finding a basis for dividing
it up.

In the end they may have lost the world right in

the heart of Europe itself.

It is sometimes said that

when the Chinese observed the Germans fighting the British
and French in China in World War I they realized that the
European man had an Achilles heel, namely, his own internal
divisions.

Unable to solve their own internal problems,

the leaders of Western civilization exhausted themselves
in war and may have lost the ability and the right to
rule the rest of the world.

It is hardly necessary to

illustrate the point by ref erring to the post World War II
period.

The Communists have found another way of

exploiting the same Western weakness and it has been
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expressed in the phrase, possibly apochryphal, attributed
to Stalin, that

11 the

road to Rome and Paris, lies through

Shanghai and New Delhi 11 •

In this context the Triple

Entente and the Triple Alliance appear to be an ironic
last pirouette of European leadership on the world stage.
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